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THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND TYPICAL OIL AND GAs 
LEASES-Probably the most common transaction employed in the de-
velopment of oil and gas deposits today is the fixed term, "thereafter" 
clause lease.1 This lease provides for a conveyance of all interest in oil 
and gas in the land for a fixed term, e.g., five years, and so long there-
after as oil or gas is produced. Another lease, of diminishing importance, 
is the "no term" lease, in which there is no fixed term, but the lessee 
is allowed to keep the lease alive indefinitely, without drilling, by the 
payment of "delay rentals." Recently, a lower California court voided 
part of a conveyance in fee simple of a tract of land which reserved a 
fixed term, "thereafter" clause oil and gas lease in the grantor as vio-
lative of the rule against perpetuities. 2 The court construed the lease 
as retaining a determinable fee in a profit a prendre in the grantor with 
an executory interest in the grantee to begin on the termination of 
drilling. Since this contingency was not certain to occur within the 
period of the rule, the executory interest was struck down. This com-
ment is concerned with the examination of various methods of creating 
future interests in gas and oil and the effect of the rule against perpetui-
ties on these interests. For the sake of clarity, these will be separated into 
two basic situations in which the interests arise. The possible invalidity 
of perpetual non-participating royalty interests or non-executive mineral 
rights, in which one person has the right to receive profits, rentals, or 
a percentage of the oil itself without having the right to develop or 
sublease the oil interest, will not be considered here.3 
1 Meyers, "The Effect of the Rule against Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-Participating 
Royalty and Kindred Interests," 32 TEx. L. REv. 369 at 370 (1953-54). 
2Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., (Cal. App. 1954) 270 P. (2d) 604. Gray has 
succinctly stated the rule as follows: "No interest subject to a condition precedent is good, 
unless the condition must be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some life in 
being at the creation of the interest." GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §201, 
p. 191 (1942). 
3 A California appellate court, in the case of Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. (2d) 
541, 114 P. (2d) 646 (1941), held that a fee simple conveyance reserving the right to 
grant oil and gas leases was invalid as a power to create interests in land which could be 
exercised beyond the period of the rule. See 2 SIMEs, FuTURE !NTEREsTs §536, p. 412 
(1936). Kansas, on the other hand, has held that an agreement to assign rents and royal-
ties from future oil leases is void since the assignee's interest in the lease is not sure to vest 
within the period of the rule. Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242 P. 140 (1926); Lathrop 
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1. The Grantor Owns Only the Oil and Gas Rights to Black.acre 
Suppose that A owns the complete oil and gas rights to Blackacre 
in fee simple, but not the surface estate. The fact that this is almost 
universally considered a property interest today4 renders it subject to 
the rule against perpetuities.5 A then conveys a fixed term, "thereafter" 
clause lease to B. Under the law of most states, B's estate is construed 
as a determinable fee simple, with a possibility of reverter in the 
grantor.0 At least one state considers it a lease with an option to renew, 
exercised by producing oil continuously from the expiration of the fixed 
term. The lessee becomes a tenant at will after the termination of the 
fixed term. 7 In the example given, it does not matter which construc-
tion is accepted since neither a reversion nor a possibility of reverter is 
subject to the rule.8 On the other hand, should A grant to B the future 
interest in the oil and gas estate, saving the fixed term, "thereafter" 
v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 227 P. (2d) 136 (1951). In other words, when the exclusive 
right to lease is separated from a property interest in the oil and gas, one court has voided 
the right and another has voided the property interest. There is not much authority for 
either view. On the subject generally, see Meyers, "The Effect of the Rule against Per-
petuities on Perpetual Non-Participating Royalty and Kindred Interests," 32 TEX. L. REv. 
369 (1953-54); Morris, "Some Legal Consequences Resulting from a Separation of the 
Incidents of Ownership of a Mineral Interest," 7 OxI.A. L. REv. 285 (1954). 
4 Some states consider it a horizontal corporeal estate in the oil and gas in place, 
analogizing it to other solid mineral estates. Sammons v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 304 
Ky. 548, 201 S.W. (2d) 719 (1947). Other states reject this contention, arguing that 
oil moves from one tract to another underground, and is incapable of being owned. It is 
therefore in the nature of a profit. Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. (2d) 
637, 52 P. (2d) 237 (1935). Cf. Thomas v. Standard Development Co., 70 Mont. 156, 
224 P. 870 (1924), where a lease which the lessee could terminate virtually at will was 
held to be an "option"; this did not necessarily negate it as a property interest, however. 
5 IA SuMMERS, 01t AND GAs, perm. ed., §134, p. 235 (1954). 
o Bruner v. Hicks, 230 ill. 536, 82 N.E. 888 (1907); Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N.M. 
564, 203 P. 539 (1922); Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298, 64 S. (2d) 344 (1953); Rosson v. 
Bennett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 294 S.W. 660. California now follows this view. Dabney 
v. Edwards, 5 Cal. (2d) 1, 53 P. (2d) 962 (1935). It should be noted that the terms 
"lessee" and ''lessor" are often used, although the interest created is not always considered 
a lease. 
7 State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W.Va. 80 at 102, 24 S.E. 688 (1896). See also 
Aikens v. Nevada Placer, Inc., 54 Nev. 281, 13 P. (2d) 1103 (1932). But cf. Wilson v. 
Reserve Gas Co., 78 W.Va. 329, 88 S.E. 1075 (1916). California at one time indicated 
approval of this doctrine in Graciosa Oil Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 155 Cal. 140, 99 
P. 483 (1909), but expressly rejected it in Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. (2d) 1, 53 P. (2d) 
962 (1935). In the latter case, the court argued that a tenancy at will was not possible 
when the lessor did not also have the option to terminate. This position has the support 
of the author of the applicable part of the AMERICAN LAW OF PRO.PERTY, as constituting 
the "modem view," although its author admits that there is authority for the view that a 
tenancy at will may exist where the lease is at the will of the lessee only. I AMERICAN 
LAw OF PROPERTY §3.30, p. 232 (1952). It might also be noted that at common law, an 
estate at \\ill is terminated on the death of either party; such a termination is not intended 
in fixed term, "thereafter" clause leases. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §3.91, pp. 
377-378 (1952). 
s Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W. (2d) 448 (1950). 
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clause lease, the difference becomes crucial. The majority rule would 
cause B's estate to be a springing executory interest, void because not 
certain to vest within the period of the rule. 9 Courts construing it as a 
lease with option to renew, however, would be spared the necessity of 
striking down B's interest, since an option to renew a lease, even if 
perpetual, does not contravene the rule.10 Parallel questions arise with 
the "no term" lease. This has also been characterized as a determinable 
fee interest,11 although it usually is construed as a perpetual renewal 
lease by using the same rationale as with the fixed term, "thereafter" 
clause lease.12 Although no case involving the rule has been found 
where the lease is retained, the "no term" lease has been held immune 
from the rule where it was conveyed by the grantor.13 
II. The Grantor Owns the Fee Simple in Black.acre 
In this situation, A has a fee simple estate in the surface as well as 
subsurface of Blackacre. Should he grant either of the aforementioned 
o This is the holding of the California court in Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 
(Cal. App. 1954) 270 P. (2d) 604. See also 2 SIMES, FUTURE INrEREsTs §504, p. 363 
(1936). 
10 Becker v. Submarine on Co., 55 Cal. App. 698, 204 P. 245 (1921); 2 SIMES, 
FUTURE INrEREsTS §511, p. 375 (1936); GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., 
§230, pp. 231-233 (1942); 3 A.L.R. 498 (1919). Gray cautions that where there is a 
substantial condition precedent to renewal, as is the case in oil and gas leases, this might 
void the lessee's power to renew. GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §230.1, pp. 
232-233 (1942). The point of attack on the conveyance has been the lessee's option. 
Where the grantor retains the lease and not the reversion, however, the grantor-lessor's 
interest might also be attacked as an executory interest subject to the condition precedent 
of non-renewal and not certain to vest in the required time. The argument of Simes, cited 
above, that commercial use is promoted rather than hindered by the lease in question seems 
to refute theoretical considerations for voiding the lease regardless of who holds the future 
interest. 
11 Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 
(1923); Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53 (1908). 
12 See the cases cited in note 13 infra, and Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co., 78 W.Va. 329, 
88 S.E. 1075 (1916), where a "no term" lease is evidently construed as a leasehold interest. 
The tendency is to consider a delay rental more as an option to renew than as a determi-
nable fee, probably because of the periodic nature of the payments. 
13 Becker v. Submarine Oil Co., 55 Cal. App. 698, 204 P. 245 (1921); Todd v. 
Manufacturers' Light and Heat Co., 90 W.Va. 40, 110 S.E. 446 (1922); Montana Consol. 
Mines Corp. v. O'Connell, 107 Mont. 273, 85 P. (2d) 345 (1938). Occasionally there 
is executed a fixed term, "thereafter" clause lease which also provides for payment of delay 
rentals after the fixed term. Attacks on this type of lease for remoteness have been unsuc-
cessful, although the nature of the lessee's interest is not agreed upon. In Rosson v. 
Bennett, (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) 294 S.W. 660, the lessee took a determinable fee. In 
Lloyd's Estate v. Mullen Tractor & Equipment Co., 192 Miss. 62, 4 S. (2d) 282 (1941), 
however, the lessee held a lease with a perpetual option to renew as long as he paid delay 
rentals. Under the holding of Dale v. Case, 217 Miss. 298, 64 S. (2d) 344 (1953), this 
lease would turn into a determinable fee when drilling was started or oil was produced. 
This itself might raise questions under the rule similar to those arising in an option to 
purchase connected with a lease, not to speak of the difficulties involved if the grantor were 
the lessee instead of the lessor, as in Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., (Cal. App. 1954) 
270 P. (2d) 604. 
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types of oil and gas lease to B, all rights in the land would be upheld,14 
as in the case where A makes a lease while owning only the oil and gas 
rights.15 If he conveys a "reversionary" oil and gas interest and reserves 
the surface fee plus the leasehold interest in the oil and gas, the grantee's 
interest would depend on the construction given to the two typical 
leases, as discussed above.16 If A conveys the fee to B, reserving an oil 
and gas lease, however, further refinements arise.17 In the first place, it 
has been argued that the retention of an oil and gas interest is con-
strued as a reservation and not an exception, and therefore, because of 
the "regrant" theory, the mineral estate of the grantee is not a springing 
executory interest but a possibility ·of reverter.18 Under the English 
theory of "regrant," when a grantor retained an easement or other in-
corporeal interest from a granted corporeal estate, he was thought of 
as obtaining the easement though an act or regrant by the grantee.19 
Thus the grantee was contemplated as the grantor of the easement, 
This concept, if carried to its logical conclusion, would confer upon 
the oil and gas interest in the present example the sanctity of a possi-
bility of reverter. Without discussing the obstacles which have to be 
overcome before this proposition can even be considered,20 the regrant 
theory cannot be accepted from either a practical or theoretical stand-
point. 21 Its application would validate the conveyance of B's interest 
14 The leases referred to from this point are the fixed term, "thereafter" clause, and 
"no term" types. 
15 Under the English regrant theory, discussed below, the grantor's reversion in the 
oil and gas lease might be void. 
16 An easement or profit which arises at a remote time is subject to the rule. 2 SIMEs, 
FUTURE hm!RESTS §509, pp. 372-373 (1936). 
17 The discussion from this point presumes that the jurisdiction involved considers the 
fixed term, "thereafter" clause lease or the "no term" lease as giving rise to a determinable 
fee. Courts holding it a lease with option to renew avoid the rule completely as pointed out 
in Part I above. 
1s Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., (Cal. App. 1954) 270 P. (2d) 604 at 611-612. 
10 2 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY §8.24, pp. 246-249 (1952). Wickham v. Hawker, 
7 M. & W. 63, 151 Eng. Rep. 679 (1840). Dictum approving the regrant theory is often 
found. See Aden v. City of Vallejo, 139 Cal. 165, 72 P. 905 (1903); Wagner v. Hanna, 
38 Cal. Ill at 116 (1869). 
20 States which construe oil and gas leases as being corporeal estates of oil and gas in 
place (note 4 supra) would of course consider the retention of the lease as an exception, 
not subject to the regrant theory. Even states which have held oil leases as incorporeal 
interests might construe the retained interest as an exception, since the intent of the 
parties is now considered as the determinative factor. See Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil 
Co., (Cal. App. 1954) 270 P. (2d) 604 at 611-612. Any incorporeal right retained from 
a corporeal grant was a reservation under the older view. 2 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY 
§106, p. 517 (1952). 
21 The regrant theory is criticized in 2 AMERICAN I.Aw OF PROPERTY §8.24, p. 248 
(1952): "It does not seem that either the theory or the requirement of a 'regrant' was nec-
essary. The theory might have been that the grantor was simply keeping some of the 
rights he already had •••• " 5 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §473, pp. 2968-2972 (1944), 
also exhibits disfavor of the theory. 
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in the present example, at the expense of voiding the same interest when 
it is reserved instead of conveyed. Furthermore, the regrant theory 
cannot be rationalized as easily in this country as in England, where 
both parties sign the deed. 22 These considerations led the California 
court to look upon the theory as "fictional," insofar as its application to 
the rule was concerned. 23 
Secondly, the future interest of B, the lessor, may be saved from 
the rule against perpetuities by means of a doctrine propounded by 
Professor Gray, who states that even if a right in land such as an ease-
ment could terminate at a remote time, the rule does not apply if it 
terminates by disappearing into the servient estate rather than by vest-
ing in a third party.24 Were this view accepted, however, B's interest 
would be saved only by tying the future oil and gas interest to the 
surface fee ownership, a hindrance to commercial transactions which 
the rule was intended to prevent. As soon as B conveys the surface 
rights away, it would seem that his oil interest would lose the protec-
tion of Gray's theory and would become void. As a practical matter, 
therefore, the intricacies involved in this type of conveyance are not 
sufficiently clear to afford businessmen the certainty necessary to create 
oil and gas leases free from the threat of the rule against perpetuities. 
III. Conclusion 
As a general rule, it may be said that the conveyance of a leasehold 
oil and gas interest seems to be safe from attack because of the rule 
against perpetuities. On the other hand, where the "reversionary" 
interest is conveyed, whether concomitant with the surface estate or 
not, it is likely to be subjected to litigation, if not destruction. The 
obvious course in avoiding the problem is suggested by the English 
22 See Wickham v. Hawker, 7 M. & W. 63, 151 Eng. Rep. 679 (1840). 
23 Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., (Cal. App. 1954) 270 P. (2d) 604 at 611-
612. The court did not decide the issue but referred to Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 
(2d) 541, 114 P. (2d) 646 (1941) in support of its averment that a reservation could be 
found to violate the rule against perpetuities. In that case, however, it was the possible 
exercise of a reserved power beyond the period of the rule which voided the reservation. 
24 GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §278, pp. 307-312 (1942). For 
example: A conveys Blackacre to B in fee simple, reserving an easement of way so long 
as A shall maintain it. Upon the failure of A to maintain the easement, it becomes a part 
of B's possessory estate. No interest is invalid. Gray's theory was followed in Egner v. 
Livingston County Board of Education, 313 Ky. 168, 230 S.W. (2d) 448 (1950). The 
California court did not consider this argument as a means of saving the grant in the 
Victory Oil Co. case, although California is committed to the view that an oil lease is an 
incorporeal profit. Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal. (2d) 637, 52 P. (2d) 
237 (1935). States which construe oil leases to be possessory estates of oil and gas in place 
cannot utilize this principle to save conveyances, since there would be no disappearance 
of an incorporeal right into a corporeal estate. 
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regrant theory. Whenever the grantor wishes to retain a lessee's inter-
est in a standard oil and gas lease, he should .first convey the fee in the 
oil and gas to the lessor-to-be, who should then convey back the oil 
lease. This simple expedient should avoid any possibility of invalidity 
under the rule against perpetuities, and should prevent embarrassment 
to conveyancers whose clients might otherwise "lose" oil and gas 
interests. 
David R. Macdonald, S.Ed. 
